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COMMUNICATION
CARCHEDI’S DIALECTICS: A CRITIQUE
Several years ago Guglielmo Carchedi (2008; 2012) published in S&S two 
interesting pieces on Marx’s dialectics and mathematics. His basic aim was to 
discover whether Marx’s Mathematical Manuscripts  provide a new insight into 
Marx’s dialectics. The reading he suggested was addressed to Marx alone, i.e., 
without Hegel and Engels. This, he argued, is the only way to grasp Marx’s 
dialectics if one wants to understand Marx in his own terms. Since Marx never 
explicated his notion of dialectics, we ought to derive it from Marx’s own work. 
To this end, Carchedi first defined “dialectics as a method of social research” 
(Carchedi, 2008, 416), and then listed three principles of dialectics: 1) “all 
phenomena are always both realized and potential”; 2) “they are always both 
determinant and determined”; 3) they are “always subject to movement and 
change” (ibid.). Later he added a fourth principle: 4) “social phenomena’s 
movement (change) is tendential” (Carchedi, 2012, 547). He emphasized 
that these principles are limited to society and not to be confused with na-
ture, because society, unlike nature, necessarily involves “human volition and 
consciousness” (ibid.). For this reason, “Engels’ dialectics of nature cannot be 
applied to society” (ibid.), a claim he also asserted in his book Behind the Crisis 
(2011, 37–8).
Given the long history of Engels criticism, Carchedi seems to follow 
an old pattern by distinguishing Marx’s social science from Engels’ nature-
philosophical enterprise. What is unique about Carchedi’s approach is that, 
to my knowledge, no one has attempted before to bridge the divide between 
dialectics and mathematics in Marx by eliminating Engels’ dialectics of 
nature.
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I will divide this Communication into two sections. In the first section, I 
will first argue that Carchedi’s approach runs into some difficulties, for Marx 
made explicit references to Hegel’s dialectics in Capital and elsewhere, and 
much of what stands and falls with Marx’s dialectics is a product of Marx and 
Engels’ close collaboration. I will also show some unmistakable similarities 
between Carchedi’s principles and Engels’ dialectics. I will conclude that 
Carchedi’s dialectics is closer to that of Engels than Carchedi thinks it is. In 
the second section, I will focus on a particular example of Engels’ dialectics, 
i.e., planetary motion, a detail which Russell Dale (2011, 563–4) mentions 
in his comment on Carchedi. However, what Dale does not mention is that 
Marx, I claim, indirectly refers to planetary motion in Capital, and calls it a 
“contradiction” (Marx, 1983, 65).
I assume that Carchedi would agree with me that we can speak of dia-
lectics of nature in Engels’ sense of the term, if Marx calls planetary motion 
a contradiction (see also Weston, 2012, 4). Since Marx does not mention 
planetary but elliptical motion, we need to examine whether Marx intended 
to mean planetary motion by the “ellipse” figure (Marx, 1983, 65). This re-
quires an investigation into Marx’s familiarity with the motion of planets and 
its feasible connections with his economic studies. I will try to show that the 
ellipse case is also helpful to understand how and why Marx came to study 
mathematics in the first place. My thesis is that Marx studied astronomy in 
general and elliptical motion of planets in particular to a great extent, and 
utilized astronomic mathematics for economic–scientific purposes. This will 
also lead us to ask whether Marx adopted a dialectics of nature by involv-
ing the notion of contradiction in planetary motion in Hegel’s and Engels’ 
sense of the term.
Carchedi’s Theoretic Patterns
It was probably Lukács (1977, 175) who first proposed to remove Engels’ 
dialectics of nature from Marx’s scientific research. He wrote in the early 
1920s that Engels was mistaken in his attempt to apply the interrelation of 
subject and object, theory and practice, logic and history to a dialectics of 
nature.1 In a similar fashion, Sartre (2004, 27) impugns Engels’ enterprise 
because the latter “presents the dialectic, a priori and without justification, 
as the fundamental law.” A “mere ordering of the facts” was an “abortive” 
initiation peculiar to a non-Marxist materialism. Lichtheim (1972, 212) claims 
that Engels’ theory did not find support in Marx. It was rather “an eclectic 
1 In his 1925 defense, Lukács (1998/99, 127–8) controversially claimed that he did not refer 
to nature but to knowledge of nature. In the late 1960s he admitted his earlier error and 
openly adopted Engels’ dialectics of nature (Lukács, 1984, 395–6).
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composite of Marx’s naturalism, Hegel’s logic and contemporary positivism.” 
Jordan (1967, 292–3) considers Engels to be a metaphysical materialist and 
contrasts him with Marx’s anthropological–naturalistic approach. Avineri 
(1975, 65) stresses that Marx’s materialism “differs sharply from the mecha-
nistic materialism expounded by Engels.” Kołakowski (1978, 402–3) ascribes 
a “latent transcendentalism” to Engels, and a “dominant anthropocentrism” 
to Marx. Engels has criticized Hegel for the “non-dialectical conception of 
nature as repeating its cycle of evolution without a break,” while Marx has 
assimilated Hegel by reversing his system and method upside-down. For 
Schmidt (1993, 55–6), Engels has sought to “interpret the area of pre- and 
extra-human nature in the sense of a purely objective  dialectic” that lapsed 
into a “dogmatic metaphysic.” Colletti (1973, 46) argues that Hegel’s idea 
of totality “is clear and self-consistent”; in Engels, however, “it becomes pure 
nonsense.”
If Carchedi claims that Engels’ dialectics does not apply to society, then, 
I would say, he clearly belongs to this anti-Engels camp. Since Engels is also 
accused of following Hegel’s mistaken lead in natural dialectics, and Marx 
was allegedly opposed to this view, one would be puzzled when facing an 
exchange between Marx and Engels in 1867, shortly before the publication 
of the first edition of Capital. As part of his research on dialectics of nature, 
Engels shares a few notes with Marx on the relation between quantity and 
quality, an aspect that he, Engels (1987b, 382), discovers when reading Hof-
mann’s Introduction to Modern Chemistry. A “molecule as the smallest part of 
matter capable of independent existence,” Engels writes, is “a perfectly ra-
tional category, a ‘nodal point,’ as Hegel calls it,” which “marks a qualitative 
change.” Marx (1987b, 385) believes that Engels is
quite right about Hofmann. Incidentally, you will also see from the conclusion of 
my Chapter III, where I outline the transformation of the master of a trade into a 
capitalist — as a result of purely quantitative changes — that in the text there I quote 
Hegel’s discovery of the law of the transformation of a merely quantitative change 
into a qualitative one as being attested by history and natural science alike.
Marx (1983, 246; 1996, 313) refers here to the following passage in Capital: 
“Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered 
by Hegel (in his Logic), that merely quantitative differences beyond a certain 
point pass into qualitative changes.” I wonder how Carchedi reads these lines. 
For he views Engels as being responsible for applying dialectics to nature. 
Following Carchedi, one could argue that Marx is no less guilty, because he 
not only shared Engels’ contention but came to the same conclusion, inde-
pendently of Engels, that there is a dialectics of nature. I suppose this is an 
example of what Carchedi (2008, 415) means by the “many inconsistencies” 
that one can find in Marx.
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What is more confusing is the similarity between Carchedi’s four prin-
ciples of dialectics and some passages in Engels’ Dialectics of Nature. Sur-
prisingly, Carchedi’s first and third principles (“realized and potential,” 
“movement and change”) are cardinal principles which Engels (1987a, 333) 
has already adopted: “The indestructibility of motion cannot be conceived 
merely quantitatively; it must also be conceived qualitatively; matter whose 
purely mechanical change of place includes indeed the possibility under 
favorable conditions of being transformed into heat, electricity, chemical 
action, life.” Carchedi’s second principle (“determinant and determined”) 
reminds me of Engels’ observations on polar opposites: “polar opposites in 
general are determined by the mutual action of the two opposite poles on 
each other, that the separation and opposition of these poles exist only within 
their mutual connection and union” (ibid., 365). It is only Carchedi’s fourth 
principle (“tendency”) on which Engels did not write anything explicit in 
Dialectics of Nature. But Engels speaks of a reciprocal relation between the at-
traction force of a planetary central body (the Sun) and the tangential force 
driving the same planet away from the Sun (ibid.). They both are tendencies 
effecting an orbit’s movement in opposite directions. In the next section I 
will argue that this relation between centripetal and tangential tendency is 
what Marx calls a contradiction.
Marx on Elliptical Motion
In the beginning of the chapter on “Metamorphosis of Commodities” 
in Capital, we read the following:
It is a contradiction, for example, for one body to continuously fall into another, and 
just as constantly fly away from it. The ellipse is one of the forms of movement in 
which this contradiction is actualized just as much as it is solved. (Marx, 1983, 65.)2
For Dale (2011, 563), elliptical motion of a planet is a “dialectically deter-
mined system,” which is also “describable in terms of the same sophisticated 
modeling system of modern mathematics that is in question in Carchedi’s 
article.”
My basic concern is whether Marx meant planetary motion when using 
the “ellipse” figure. If the ellipse figure refers to planetary motion, which 
Marx calls a contradiction, then we can conclude that Marx had a concept 
of dialectics of nature. However, if Marx did not intend to mean planetary 
2 “Es ist z. B. ein Widerspruch, daß ein Körper beständig in einen andern fällt und eben 
so beständig von ihm weg flieht. Die Ellipse ist eine der Bewegungsformen, worin dieser 
Widerspruch sich eben so sehr verwirklicht als löst.” I borrow the English translation of this 
passage from Thomas Weston (2012, 5–6).
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motion and associates contradiction with something else, then his illustration 
is arbitrarily chosen and the ellipse case can be dropped.
Marx’s physics and astronomy readings go back to his dissertation in 
the late 1830s and early 1840s (Marx, 1976a, 111–12). There is evidence that 
he was studying the theories of Kepler, Leibniz, Newton, and Hegel in the 
1840s and 1850s. When reading Newton’s Principia, he noted: “Well said, old 
Isaak Newton” and “Bravo, old Newton!” (Kaiser and Werchan, 1967, 127). 
It is evident from a 1842 newspaper article that he was well-informed about 
the Leibniz–Newton controversy (Marx, 1975, 178). In The German Ideology, 
he claims that Newton “completed mechanics” (Marx, 1970, 49). In a 1853 
column he mentions “the law of contact of extremes” which is related to “the 
laws of Kepler” and “Newton’s great discovery” (Marx, 1984, 147). Two years 
before Capital’s publication, Marx (1987b, 529–30) informs Engels that he 
“‘took the opportunity’ to ‘take up’ a little astronomy again.” This time he 
was focused on “Laplace’s theory of the formation of the celestial Systems 
and how he explains the rotation of the various bodies around their own 
axis.” He also mentions that Laplace’s theory has been further developed 
by an American astronomer, Daniel Kirkwood, who
discovered a kind of law concerning the difference in the rotation of the planets, 
which had previously appeared quite abnormal. . . . between two planets there must 
be a point at which their power of attraction is equally strong; so that a body at this 
point would remain stationary between them. . . . the body would fall towards one 
planet or another on either side of that point. This point thus forms the limits of 
the sphere of attraction of the planet. . . . Kirkwood concluded from this that . . . a 
specific relationship must exist between the velocity of the planet’s rotation and the 
breadth of the ring from which it was formed or its sphere of attraction. . . . Old Hegel 
made some very good jokes about the “sudden reversal” of centripetal to centrifugal 
force, right at the moment when one has attained “preponderance” over the other; 
e.g., centripetal force is greatest near the sun; therefore, says Hegel, centrifugal force is 
greatest, since it overcomes this maximum of centripetal force and vice versa. Moreover, 
the forces are in equilibrium when half way between the apsides. Therefore they can 
never depart from this equilibrium. (Ibid.)
Marx is mainly concerned with the equilibrium dynamics of the elliptical mo-
tion of different orbits rotating around the Sun, that is, the reason why they 
do not fall into or fly away from the Sun. The aforementioned jokes of Hegel 
are related to his refusal of Newton’s consideration of an orbit’s tangential 
tendencies as forces. A passage in Capital shows that Marx was familiar with 
a popular idea widely circulated among many leading 19th-century astrono-
mers: that a planet’s rotative equilibrium would end by eventually hitting the 
Sun. He writes that capital is no more concerned with “coming degradation 
and final depopulation of the human race, as by the probable fall of the earth 
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into the sun” (Marx, 1987a, 272–73). Regarding the apocalyptic collapse of 
Earth, we read something similar in Engels’ Anti-Dühring (1988, 439):
The capitalist mode of production moves in these two appearance forms of the contra-
diction immanent to it from its very origin. It is never able to get out of that “vicious 
circle”. . . . this circle is gradually narrowing; that the motion presents rather a spiral, 
and must reach to its end, like the motion of the planets, by collision with the center.
Some sources that were known both to Marx and Engels defend the 
apocalyptic collapse thesis. For instance, Helmholtz (1854, 38–9) believes 
that the ellipses of comets around the sun become “ever narrower,” and “a 
time will come when the comet will strike the sun, and a similar end threat-
ens all the planets”; “they must . . . approach the sun.” Mayer (1874, 171) 
argues that planetary bodies rotate “in ever narrower orbits around the sun 
and at last fall into it.” Thomson and Tait (1872, 192) assert that the “effect 
of a continued tangential force . . . is to gradually increase the distance from 
the central body, and to cause as much again as its own amount of work to 
be done against the attraction of the central mass, by the kinetic energy of 
motion lost.”
All in all, what Marx (and Engels) read and wrote on elliptical motion 
gives us good reason to think that Marx’s illustrative choice in Capital was 
not arbitrary, but a conscious and purposeful one. But why call it a contra-
diction? Note that Marx (1983, 481) views “the Hegelian ‘contradiction’” 
as “the source of all dialectics.” Hegel (1986, 80) believes that there is a 
contradiction between gravitational force and all orbits that fall towards it. 
Gravitation “contradicts the law of inertia.” The elliptical motion of orbits 
“is composed of this [gravitational] drive and of the tangential direction” 
(ibid., 83). What Hegel calls “tangential direction” or “diagonal” (ibid., 97) 
interacts with the gravitational force of the central body that results in the 
elliptical rotation of orbits.
Why is mathematics relevant to all this? Shortly after their exchange on 
Kirkwood, Marx sent a mathematical extract to Engels, and wrote that the 
“whole of the differential calculus arose originally from the task of drawing 
tangents through any point on any curve,” e.g., an “ellipse.” Marx’s 1873 letter 
to Engels shows that Marx started to make use of tangents, curves and ellipses, 
this time in an economic context. In order to “determine mathematically the 
principal laws governing crises” one must begin with “calculating these ups 
and downs,” i.e., the “irregular curves” (Marx, 1976b, 82). Therefore it is not 
surprising that ellipses become a main subject of his “On the Differential” 
and “Outlines and Excerpts on History of Mathematics and Mechanics 
from Poppe’s Book” in his Mathematical Manuscripts (Marx, 1968, 70, 88–90, 
247). This is why I argue that Marx utilized his astronomical–mathematical 
knowledge for economic–scientific purposes.
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The Argument Reversed
Despite the evidence presented above, one can still argue that Marx did 
not intend the “ellipse” figure to mean planetary motion. This is a reasonable 
objection, because Marx did not make any explicit reference to planetary 
motion. Therefore I will suppose, for a moment, that he did not intend to 
refer to planetary curves. Is Marx’s description of the ellipse still useful to 
decide whether planetary motion involves a contradiction? This presupposes 
an explicit definition of contradiction which Marx, according to Carchedi 
(2008, 416), never provides. So “we should,” the argument goes, “extract it 
from Marx’s own work.” This brings us back to Carchedi’s four principles 
of dialectics.
If there is a “standard definition” of dialectics or contradiction, then it 
should be able to encompass all four modes of dialectical contradiction pro-
posed by Carchedi. This means we should seek the most general properties 
that are common in all four modes of dialectical contradiction. Regarding 
this generalization, I find the following structure most plausible: all four prin-
ciples involve one subject (phenomenon) that asserts two opposite predicates 
(realized/potential, determinant/determined, stability/change, tendency/
counter-tendency). This means that every phenomenon that can satisfy this 
definition is subject to dialectical contradiction. Although Carchedi would 
like to have this scheme limited to society, there are natural phenomena 
that can equally satisfy this definition. Elliptical motion is a good example 
in this regard.
Marx speaks of an orbital body (subject) that tends to fall into (predi-
cate) and fly away from (opposite predicate) the Sun. This seems to be the 
reason why Hegel, long before Marx, believed he had found a contradic-
tion in elliptical motion. Engels, on the other hand, says something slightly 
different from Marx. For Engels (1985, 45), the contradiction is between 
“attraction” of the Sun and the “tangential force” of the orbit. This means 
that Engels speaks of two subjects (the Sun and the orbit), and places the 
contradiction between attraction (predicate) of the Sun and the tangential 
force (opposite predicate) of the orbit. Either Engels’ understanding of the 
ellipse violates the standard definition which we have developed based on 
Carchedi’s principles, or our definition of dialectics is not general enough 
to encompass Engels’ understanding of dialectical contradictions.
Conclusion
Marx (2004, 245) writes that the capitalist accumulation process neces-
sarily involves “contradictory tendencies” and “contending agencies,” and 
that the
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conflict of contending agencies finds vent in crises. The crises are always but momen-
tary and forcible solutions of the existing contradictions. They are violent eruptions 
which for a time restore the disturbed equilibrium.
Is this to say that, since planetary motion consists of contradictory tenden-
cies, the destiny of cosmological order will follow the lead of capitalist ac-
cumulation? I believe most of Engels’ critics, who accuse him of relapsing 
into positivism, would expect that Engels answers this question affirmatively. 
Since Marx makes the same analogy between planetary motion and capitalist 
accumulation, he can be charged with positivism, as well. But this, in turn, is 
to overlook Marx’s (and Engels’) original emphasis, or to miss their point: 
It is the structural identity of existence and development of contradictions 
that enables us to make comparisons or build analogies between different 
social and natural phenomena. A discipline like mathematics that applies to 
both social and natural phenomena is not different from dialectics in this 
regard. It is therefore inconsistent to dump dialectics of nature, on one side, 
and insert a dialectical mathematics, on the other. At least for Carchedi, it 
might be worth reconsidering whether Engels’ (1985, 293) definition of 
dialectics as the “science of universal inter-connection” can promise any 
fruitful potential for the issue at stake, namely the inter-connection between 
mathematics and dialectics.
Kaan Kangal
Center for Studies of Marxist Social Theory
Nanjing University
Xianlin Campus, Qixia District, 38
Nanjing, Jiangsu, 210046
Peoples Republic of China
kaankangal@gmail.com
REFERENCES
Avineri, Shlomo. 1975. The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx. London: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Carchedi, Guglielmo. 2008. “Dialectics and Temporality in Marx’s Mathematical 
Manuscripts.” Science & Society, 72:4 (October), 415–426.
———. 2011. Behind the Crisis: Marx’s Dialectics of Value and Knowledge. Leiden, The 
Netherlands: Brill.
———. 2012. “Mathematics and Dialectics in Marx: A Reply.” Science & Society, 76:4 
(October), 546–549.
Colletti, Lucio. 1973. Marxism and Hegel. London: New Left Books.
Dale, Russell. 2011. “Guglielmo Carchedi on Marx, Calculus, Time and Dialectics.” 
Science & Society, 75:4 (October), 555–566.
G4548.indd   434 4/21/2017   1:46:38 PM
 CARCHEDI’S DIALECTICS 435
Engels, Friedrich. 1985. Dialektik der Natur. In Karl Marx Friedrich Engels, Gesamtaus-
gabe (MEGA), Vol. I/26.1. Berlin: Dietz.
———. 1987a. Dialectics of Nature. Pp. 313–612 in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 
Collected Works, Vol. 25. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
———. 1987b. Engels to Marx, June 16, 1867. Pp. 381–383 in Karl Marx and Frederick 
Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 42. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
———. 1988. Anti-Dühring. In Karl Marx Friedrich Engels, Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), 
Vol. I/27.1. Berlin: Dietz.
Hegel, G. W. F. 1986. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. 
1830. Zweiter Teil. In Hegel, Werke, Vol. 9. Frankfurt a. M., Germany: Suhrkamp.
Helmholtz, Heinz. 1854. Ueber die Wechselwirkung der Naturkräfte und die darauf bezügli-
chen neuesten Ermittelungen der Physik. Ein populär-wissenschaftlicher Vortrag gehalten 
am 7 Februar 1854. Königsberg, Germany: Gräfe.
Jordan, Z. A. 1967. The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism: A Philosophical and Sociologi-
cal Analysis. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Kaiser, Bruno, and Inge Werchan. 1967. Ex Libris. Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels. 
Schicksal und Verzeichnis einer Bibliothek. Berlin: Dietz.
Kołakowski, Leszek. 1978. Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution. 
Volume I: The Founders. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Lichtheim, George. 1972. Europe in the Twentieth Century. New York: Praeger Publishers.
Lukács, Georg. 1977. Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein. In Georg Lukács, Werke, Vol. 2. 
Neuwied, Germany: Luchterhand.
———. 1984. Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins. I. Halbband. In Georg Lukács, 
Werke, Vol. 13. Neuwied, Germany: Luchterhand.
———. 1998–99. “Chvotismus und Dialektik (1925/26).” Pp. 119–159 in Lukács 
1998/99. Jahrbuch der Internationalen Georg-Lukács-Gesellschaft. Paderborn, Ger-
many: Janus-Druck.
Marx, Karl. 1968. Matematicheskie Rukopisi. Moskva: Izdatel’stvo “Nauka”.
———. 1975. “Der leitende Artikel in Nr. 179 der ‘Kölnischen Zeitung’.” Pp. 172–190 
in Karl Marx Friedrich Engels, Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), Vol. I/1.1. Berlin: Dietz.
———. 1976a. Hefte zur epikureischen Philosophie. Fünftes Heft. Pp. 93–118 in Karl Marx 
Friedrich Engels, Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), Vol. IV/1.1. Berlin: Dietz.
———. 1976b. Marx an Engels, 31 Mai 1873. Pp. 82–84 in Karl Marx Friedrich Engels, 
Werke (MEW), Vol. 33. Berlin: Dietz.
———. 1983. Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Erster Band. Hamburg 1867. 
In Karl Marx Friedrich Engels, Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), Vol. II/5.1. Berlin: Dietz.
———. 1984. “Revolution in China and in Europe.” Pp. 147–153 in Karl Marx Fried-
rich Engels, Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), Vol. I/12.1. Berlin: Dietz.
———. 1987a. Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Erster Band. Hamburg 1872. 
In Karl Marx Friedrich Engels, Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), Vol. II/6.1. Berlin: Dietz.
———. 1987b. Marx to Engels, 19 August 1865. Pp. 183–186 in Karl Marx and Fred-
erick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 42. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
———. 1987c. Marx to Engels, 22 June 1867. Pp. 383–386 in Karl Marx and Frederick 
Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 42. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
———. 1996. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume I. In Karl Marx and Fred-
erick Engels, Collected Works. Moscow Progress Publishers.
G4548.indd   435 4/21/2017   1:46:38 PM
436 SCIENCE & SOCIETY
———. 2004. Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Dritter Band. Hamburg 1894. In 
Karl Marx Friedrich Engels, Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), Vol. II/15.1. Berlin: Akademie.
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1970. Die Deutsche Ideologie. In Karl Marx Friedrich 
Engels, Gesamtausgabe (MEGA1), Vol. I/5. Glashütten im Taunus, Germany:  Detlev 
Auvermann.
Mayer, J. R. 1874. Die Mechanik der Wärme in gesammelten Schriften. Stuttgart, Germany: 
Cotta.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 2004. Critique of Dialectical Reason. Volume 1: Theory of Practical 
Ensembles. London: Verso.
Schmidt, Alfred. 1993. Der Begriff der Natur in der Lehre von Marx. Hamburg, Germany: 
Europäische Verlagsanstalt.
Thomson, William, and Peter Guthrie Tait. 1872. Treatise on Natural Philosophy. Vol. I. 
Oxford, England: Clarendon.
Weston, Thomas. 2012. “Marx on the Dialectics of Elliptical Motion.” Historical Ma-
terialism, 20:4, 3–38.
G4548.indd   436 4/21/2017   1:46:38 PM
